Introduction: The Vinaya piţaka ( The basket of disciplinary rules) consists of incorporated injunction and admonitions of the Buddha on modes of conduct and to be restraint from evil things. The Vinaya pitaka is made up of five books. They are as follows”
1 Pārājikapāli
2. Pācittiyapāli
3. Mahāvaggapāli
4. Cullavaggapāli
5. Parivārapāli
They mainly discusses about the rules and regulations for monks, and lay people. They also deal with transgression or offences, which are not allowed to do. For the twenty years after the establish of the order (sańgha) the Buddha did not promulgate any disciplinary rules concerning Pārājika and Sanghadisesa offences. The order went on purely without any pollution and many disciples attained three, four stage (sotāpanna, sakadāgāmi, anāgāmi and arahagāmi). But as the time went by the order grew in strength. Undesirable elements such as not having the purest motives but attractive only to be famous(yasa) and gain (lābha) ect. Prompted some bhikkhus to get into the order. Some twenty years after funding of the order it became necessary for the Buddha promulgate rules relation to the grave offences.
According to the Pāli canon the first disciplinary rule was promulgate because by the Buddha because of the bhikkhu Suninda, a native of Kalanda village near Vesali committed the offence of having sexual intercourse with his ex-wife.
From this time the more the bhikkhu acted in unsuitable ways the more the Buddha promulgate disciplinary rules. It is said that even the Buddha who was Fully Enlightened followed the vinaya rules for Buddha laid down by the early Buddha’s
Sańghādisesa
The Thirteen Sanghādisesa – Requiring Formal Meetings of the Community
This is a very serious class of offence. However, any offending bhikkhu can be rehabilitated through confession and supervised probation. Finally, the bhikkhu needs to be reinstated by a specially convened Community (Sangha) meeting of at least twenty monks.
This term means "involving the Community in the initial (ādi) and subsequent (sesa) acts." It derives from the fact that the Community is the agent that initially calls on the bhikkhu who breaks any of the rules in this category to undergo the penalty (of mānatta, penance, and parivāsa, probation), subsequently reimposes the penalty if he does not properly carry it out, and finally lifts the penalty when he does. There are thirteen training rules here, the first nine entailing a sańghādisesa immediately on transgression, the last four only after the offender has been rebuked three times as part of a Community transaction.
The Eight sikkhāpada states:
Pañhamaduññhadosasikkhàpadaü:
Yo pana bhikkhu bhikkhuü duññho doso appatãto amålakena pàràjikena dhammena anuddhaüseyya: ßAppeva nàma naü imamhà brahmacariyà càveyyan-ti.û. Tato aparena samayena samanuggàhiyamàno và asamanuggàhiyamàno và, amålaka¤-ceva taü adhikaraõaü hoti, bhikkhu ca dosaü patiññhàti, saïghàdiseso.
(Should any bhikkhu — corrupt, aversive, disgruntled — charge a bhikkhu with an unfounded case entailing defeat, (thinking), "Perhaps I may bring about his fall from this celibate life," then regardless of whether or not he is cross-examined on a later occasion, if the issue is unfounded and the bhikkhu confesses his aversion, it entails initial and subsequent meetings of the Community.)
"Now at that time a householder who served fine food gave food to the Community on a regular basis, four bhikkhus every day... (One day) he happened to go on some business to the monastery. He went to Ven. Dabba Mallaputta and on arrival bowed down to him and sat to one side... Ven. Dabba Mallaputta roused... him with a Dhamma talk. Then the householder with fine food... said to Dabba Mallaputta, 'To whom, venerable sir, is tomorrow's meal in our house assigned?'
"'...To (the) followers of Mettiya and Bhummaja , householder.' Mettiya and Bhummaja were among the leaders of the group-of-six bhikkhus — so called because the group had six ringleaders — a faction notorious for its shameless behavior, and instigators of many of the situations that compelled the Buddha to formulate training rules.
"This upset the householder with fine food. Thinking, 'How can these evil bhikkhus eat in our house?' he returned home and ordered his female slave, 'Hey. Those who are coming for a meal tomorrow: Prepare a seat for them in the gatehouse and serve them unhusked rice porridge with pickle brine.'
"'As you say, master,' the female slave answered...
"Then the followers of Mettiya and Bhummaja said to one another, 'Yesterday we were assigned a meal at the house of the householder with fine food. Tomorrow, attending with his wives and children, he will serve us. Some will offer rice; some will offer curry, some oil, and some condiments.' Because of their joy, they didn't sleep as much that night as they had hoped.
"Early the next morning... they went to the home of the householder with fine food. The female slave saw them coming from afar. On seeing them, and having prepared them a seat in the gatehouse, she said to them, 'Have a seat, honored sirs.'
"The thought occurred to the followers of Mettiya and Bhummaja, 'No doubt the food isn't ready yet, which is why we're being made to sit in the gatehouse.'
"Then the female slave presented them with unhusked rice porridge with pickle brine and said, 'Eat, honored sirs.'
"'Sister, we're the ones here for the regular meal.'
"'I know you're the ones here for the regular meal. But yesterday the householder ordered me, "Hey. Those who are coming for a meal tomorrow: Prepare a seat for them in the gatehouse and serve them unhusked rice porridge with pickle brine." So eat, honored sirs.'
"Then the followers of Mettiya and Bhummaja said to one another, 'Yesterday the householder with fine food went to the monastery and met with Dabba Mallaputta. No doubt Dabba Mallaputta turned him against us.' Because of their disappointment, they didn't eat as much as they had hoped.
"Then... they returned to the monastery and, putting away their robes and bowls, went outside the monastery gatehouse and sat with their outer robes holding up their knees-silent, abashed, their shoulders drooping, their heads down, brooding, at a loss for words.
"Then Mettiyā Bhikkhunī approached them... and said to them, 'I salute you, masters.' But when she had said this, they didn't respond. A second time... A third time she said, 'I salute you, masters.' And a third time they didn't respond.
"'Have I offended you, masters? Why don't you respond to me?'
"'Because you, sister, look on impassively while Dabba Mallaputta treats us like dirt.'
"'What can I do?'
"'If you want, you could get the Blessed One to expel Dabba Mallaputta right this very day.'
"'What can I do? How could I do that?'
"'Come, sister. Go to the Blessed One and say this: "It is unfitting, venerable sir, and improper. The quarter without dread, without harm, without danger, is (now) the quarter with dread, with harm, with danger. From where there was calm, there is (now) a storm-wind. The water, as it were, is ablaze. I have been raped by Master Dabba Mallaputta."'
"'As you say, masters.' (And she went to carry out their bidding.)"
This is just the heart of the origin story to this rule, which is one of the longest and most controversial accounts in the Vinaya. After Mettiyā Bhikkhunī made her charge, the Buddha convened a meeting of the Sańgha to question Ven. Dabba Mallaputta. The latter, who had attained arahantship at the age of seven, responded truthfully that he could not call to mind ever having indulged in sexual intercourse even in a dream, much less when awake. The Buddha then told the Saṅgha to expel Mettiyā Bhikkhunī and to interrogate her instigators, after which he returned to his quarters. When the bhikkhus had expelled her, the followers of Mettiya and Bhummaja told them, "Friends, don't expel Mettiyā Bhikkhunī. She hasn't done anything wrong. She was instigated by us, who were upset, dissatisfied, and wanted to see him fall."
"'You mean you were charging Ven. Dabba Mallaputta with an unfounded case entailing defeat?'
"'Yes, friends.'
"So the bhikkhus criticized and complained and spread it about, 'How can the followers of Mettiya and Bhummaja charge Ven. Dabba Mallaputta with an unfounded case entailing defeat?'"
In the centuries after the Canon was composed, however, many people have criticized and complained more about the Buddha's treatment of Mettiyā Bhikkhunī. According to the Commentary, her expulsion was one of the controversial points dividing the bhikkhus in the Abhayagiri Vihāra from those in the Mahāvihāra in the old Sri Lankan capital of Anurādhapura. Even modern scholars have objected to the Buddha's treatment of Mettiyā Bhikkhunī and interpret this passage as a "monkish gloss," as if the Buddha himself were not a monk, and the entire Canon not the work of monks and nuns. The Commentary maintains that the Buddha acted as he did because he knew if he treated her less harshly, the followers of Mettiya and Bhummaja would never have volunteered the information that they had put her up to making the charge in the first place, and the truth would never have come out. This would have led some people to remain secretly convinced of Ven. Dabba Mallaputta's guilt and — because he was an arahant — would have been for their long-term detriment and harm.
At any rate, what concerns us here is that at some point after this rule was formulated, the Buddha put the Saṅgha in charge of judging accusations of this sort and gave them a definite pattern to follow to ensure that their judgments would be as fair and accurate as possible. Because the Vibhaṅga and Commentary to this rule are based on this pattern, we will discuss the pattern first before dealing with the special case — unfounded charges — covered by this rule.
Admonition. As the Buddha states in Sg 12, one of the ways bhikkhus may hope for growth in his teachings is through mutual admonition and mutual rehabilitation. If a bhikkhu commits an offense, he is responsible for informing his fellow bhikkhus so that they may help him through whatever procedures the offense may entail. Human nature being what it is, there are bound to be bhikkhus who neglect this responsibility, in which case the responsibility falls to the offender's fellow bhikkhus who know of the matter to admonish him in private, if possible, or — if he is stubborn — to make a formal charge in a meeting of the Community.
The pattern here is this: Before admonishing the bhikkhu, one must first make sure that one is qualified to admonish him. According to Cv.IX.5.1-2, this means knowing that:
i) One is pure in bodily conduct.
ii) One is pure in verbal conduct.
iii) One is motivated by good will, not vindictiveness.
iv) One is learned in the Dhamma.
v) One knows both Pāṭimokkhas (the one for the bhikkhus and the one for the bhikkhunīs) in detail.
Furthermore, one determines that:
i) I will speak at the right time and not at the wrong time.
ii) I will speak about what is factual and not what is unfactual.
iii) I will speak gently and not harshly.
iv) I will speak what is connected with the goal (attha) and not what is unconnected with the goal (this can also mean: what is connected with the case and not what is unconnected with the case).
v) I will speak from a mind of good will and not from inner aversion.
Cv.IX.5.7 and Pv.XV.5.3 add that one should keep five qualities in mind: compassion, solicitude for the other's welfare, sympathy, a desire to see him rehabilitated, and esteem for the Vinaya.
If one feels unqualified in terms of these standards yet believes that another bhikkhu has committed an offense for which he has not made amends, one should find another bhikkhu who is qualified to handle the charge and inform him. Not to inform anyone in cases like this is to incur a pācittiya or a derived offense under Pc 64, except in the extenuating circumstances discussed under that rule.
The next step, if one is qualified to make the charge, is to look for a proper time and place to talk with the other party — for example, when he is not likely to get embarrassed or upset — and then to ask his leave, i.e., to ask permission to speak with him: "Let the venerable one give me leave. I want to speak with you — Karotu āyasmā okāsaṃ. Ahan-taṃ vattukāmo." To accuse him of an offense without asking leave is to incur a dukkaṭa (Mv.II.16.1).
As for the other party, he may give leave, or not, depending on his assessment of the individual asking for leave, for it is possible that someone might ask for leave without any real grounds, simply to be abusive. (This interpretation follows the Burmese edition on the relevant passage, Mv.II.16.3. In other editions, the same passage says that one is allowed to make another bhikkhu give leave after having assessed him. However, in the context of the allowance — some group-of-six bhikkhus ask leave of bhikkhus they know are pure — there seems no need to allow a bhikkhu to reflect on whether the person he plans to accuse might be pure. That is one of the accuser's duties, as enforced by the present rule along with the following rule, Pc 76, and another passage in Mv.II.16.3. As for the case of asking leave of someone who might prove abusive, that is already covered in Mv.II.16.2, which says that even after another bhikkhu has given leave, one should assess him before leveling a charge against him. Thus, in context, the Burmese reading makes more sense: Having been asked to give leave, one is allowed to assess the person making the request before giving him leave to speak. If we did not follow the Burmese reading here, there would be no allowance in the Vibhaṅga or the Khandhakas not to give leave to an abusive accuser.) A bhikkhu who asks for leave with no grounds — i.e., he has not seen the other party commit the offense, has heard no reliable report to that effect, and has no reason to suspect anything to that effect — incurs a dukkaṭa (Mv.II.16.3).
Pv.XV.4.7 gives further support to the Burmese reading here by suggesting that one should not give leave to a bhikkhu who:
i) is unconscientious,
ii) is ignorant,
iii) is not in regular standing (e.g., he is undergoing penance for a sañghādisesa offense or has been placed under a disciplinary transaction),
iii) speaks intent on creating a disturbance, or
iv) is not intent on rehabilitating the bhikkhu he is accusing.
Pv.XV.5.4 suggests further that one should not give leave to a bhikkhu who:
i) is not pure in bodily conduct,
ii) is not pure in verbal conduct,
iii) is not pure in his livelihood,
iv) is incompetent and inexperienced, or
v) is unable to give a consistent line of reasoning when questioned.
If the bhikkhu is not unqualified in any of these ways, though, one should willingly give him leave to speak. Cv.IX.5.7 says that, when being admonished or accused, one should keep two qualities in mind: truth and staying unprovoked. The Pāṭimokkha also contains a number of rules imposing penalties on behaving improperly when one is being admonished formally or informally: Sg 12 for being difficult to admonish in general, Pc 12 for being evasive or refusing to answer when being formally questioned (see below), Pc 54 for being disrespectful to one's accuser or to the rule one is being accused of breaking, and Pc 71 for finding excuses for not following a particular training rule.
If both sides act in good faith and without prejudice, accusations of this sort are easy to settle on an informal basis. If an accusation can't be settled informally, it should be taken to a meeting of the Community so that the group as a whole may pass judgment. The procedures for this sort of formal meeting will be discussed under the aniyata and adhikaraṇa-samatha rules. If the issue is to be brought up at a Community meeting for the uposatha, there are extra procedures to be followed, which are discussed in BMC2, Chapter 15. If the issue is to be brought up at the Invitation at the end of the Rains, the procedures to be followed are discussed in BMC2, Chapter 16.
Abuse of the system. As shown in the origin story to this rule, a bhikkhu making a charge against another bhikkhu might be acting out of a grudge and simply making up the charge. This rule and the following one cover cases where the made-up charge is that the other bhikkhu has committed a pārājika. Pc 76 covers cases where the made-up charge is that he has broken a less serious rule.
The full offense under this rule involves four factors.
1) Object: The other bhikkhu is regarded as ordained.
2) Perception: One perceives him to be innocent of the offense one is charging him with.
3) Intention: One wants to see him expelled from the Saṅgha.
4) Effort: One makes an unfounded charge in his presence that he is guilty of a pārājika offense.
Object. The definition of this factor — the other bhikkhu is regarded as ordained — may sound strange, but it comes from the K/Commentary, which apparently extended the principle expressed in the factor of perception, explained below, that if one perceives the bhikkhu as innocent of the charge one is making, the fact of whether he is actually innocent is irrelevant to the offense under this rule. In the same way, the K/Commentary seems to be reasoning, if one perceives the bhikkhu to be a bhikkhu, the fact of whether he is actually a bhikkhu is irrelevant to this offense. The K/Commentary makes this point for a reason: In normal cases the object of this rule will be an innocent bhikkhu, but there may be cases where a bhikkhu has actually committed a pārājika offense that no one knows about; instead of disrobing, he acts as if he were still a bhikkhu, and everyone else assumes that he still is. Yet even a "bhikkhu" of this sort would fulfill this factor as far as this rule is concerned.
For example, Bhikkhu X steals some of the monastery funds, but no one knows about it, and he continues to act as if he were a bhikkhu. Bhikkhu Y later develops a grudge against him and makes an unfounded charge that he has had sexual intercourse with one of the monastery supporters. Even though X is not really a bhikkhu, the fact that people in general assume him to be one means that he fulfills this factor.
Perception. If one perceives the bhikkhu one is charging with a pārājika offense to be innocent of the offense, that is enough to fulfill this factor regardless of whether the accused is actually innocent or not. To make an accusation based on the assumption or suspicion that the accused is not innocent entails no offense.
Intention. The wording of the training rule suggests that this factor would have to be fulfilled by impulse — aversion — together with motive — desiring the other bhikkhu's expulsion — but the Vibhañga consistently conflates these two sub-factors under motive. Thus all that is needed to fulfill this factor is the desire to see the other bhikkhu expelled. If one's motive is simply to insult him, the Vibhaṅga says that one's actions would come under Pc 2. If one's motive is both to see him expelled and to insult him, one incurs both a saṅghādisesa and a pācittiya. The texts do not explicitly mention this point, but it would appear that if one has a strange sense of humor and is making the false charge as a joke with no intention of being insulting or taken seriously, one's actions would come under Pc 1.
According to the Vibhaṅga, confessing one's aversion simply means admitting that the charge was empty or false. Thus the level of malice impelling one's desire to see the other bhikkhu expelled need not be severe: If one wants to see him expelled just for the fun of it, that would fulfill the factor of intention here.
Effort. The act covered by this rule is that of making an unfounded charge of a pārājika in the accused's presence. Whether one makes the charge oneself or gets someone else to make it, the penalty is the same. If that "someone else" is a bhikkhu and knows the charge is unfounded, he too incurs the full penalty.
The Vibhaṅga defines an unfounded charge as one having no basis in what has been seen, heard, or suspected. In other words, the accuser has not seen the accused committing the offense in question, nor has he heard anything reliable to that effect, nor is there anything in the accused's behavior to give rise to any honest suspicion.
Seeing and hearing, according to the Commentary, also include the powers of clairvoyance and clairaudience one may have developed through meditation. Thus if one charges X with having committed a pārājika offense on the basis of what one has seen clairvoyantly, this would not be an unfounded charge, although one should be careful to make clear from the very beginning what kind of seeing the charge is based on.
If there is some basis in fact, but one changes the status of the evidence, the penalty is the same. Changing the status means, e.g., saying that one saw something when in actuality one simply heard about it or suspected it, or that one saw it clearly when in actuality one saw it indistinctly.
An example from the Commentary: Bhikkhu X goes into a grove to relieve himself. Ms. Y goes into the same grove to get something there. One sees them leaving the grove at approximately the same time — which could count as grounds for suspicion — but one then accuses Bhikkhu X, saying that one actually saw him having sex with Ms. Y. This would count as an unfounded charge. Another example: In the dark of the night, one sees a man stealing something from the monastery storehouse. He looks vaguely like Bhikkhu Z, but one can't be sure. Still, one firms up one's accusation by saying that one definitely saw Z steal the item. Again, this would count as an unfounded charge.
The Commentary states that for an unfounded charge to count under this rule, it must state explicitly (a) the precise act the accused supposedly committed (e.g., having sexual intercourse, getting a woman to have an abortion) or (b) that the accused is guilty of a pārājika, or (c) that the accused is no longer a true bhikkhu. If one simply says or does something that might imply that the accused is no longer a bhikkhu — e.g., refusing to show him respect in line with his seniority — that does not yet count as a charge.
The Commentary adds that charging a bhikkhu with having committed an equivalent or derived pārājika, as discussed in the conclusion to the preceding chapter, would fulfill this factor as well. For instance, if one makes an unfounded charge accusing Bhikkhu A of having killed his father before his ordination, that would constitute a full offense here. The Vibhaṅga makes no mention of these equivalent pārājikas under this rule, but the Great Standards can be used to justify their inclusion here.
All of the charges given as examples in the Vibhaṅga are expressed directly to the accused — "I saw you commit a pārājika offense," "I heard you commit a pārājika offense" — and the Commentary concludes from this that the full offense occurs only when one makes the charge in the accused's presence, in line with the pattern for admonition discussed above. To make an unfounded charge behind the accused's back, it states, incurs a dukkaṭa.
There is nothing in the Vibhaṅga to indicate that the Commentary is wrong here, aside from the consideration that — because the charge is unfounded — it could entail a pācittiya for deliberate lying. Some people, however, have objected to the Commentary's position here, saying that a dukkaṭa or even a pācittiya is a very light penalty for backhanded character assassination. Nevertheless, we should remember that the correct procedures for making an accusation require that an earnest charge be made in the presence of the accused. If a bhikkhu spreads gossip about another bhikkhu, accusing him of having committed a pārājika, he should be asked whether he has taken up the matter with the accused. If he hasn't, he should be told to speak to the accused before he speaks to anyone else. If he says that he doesn't feel qualified or that he fears the accused will retaliate, he should be told to take the matter up with the bhikkhus who will be responsible for calling a meeting of the Community. If he refuses to do that, he shouldn't be listened to.
For some reason, the Commentary maintains that a charge made in writing does not count, although a charge made by gesture — e.g., pointing at the accused when one is asked who committed the pārājika — does. Perhaps in those days written charges were regarded as too cowardly to take seriously.
The rule seems to require that the accuser confess that he was acting out of depraved impulses, although the Vibhaṅga states that this means simply that he admits the charge was a lie. The Commentary states further that here the rule is showing the point where the rest of the Community knows that the bhikkhu making the charge is guilty of a saṅghādisesa: He actually committed the offense when he made the charge.
The K/Commentary adds "result" as a further factor to the offense under this rule, saying that the accused must immediately understand the charge — but nothing in the Vibhaṅga supports this added factor.
Whether anyone actually believes the charge is not a factor here.
Non-offenses. If one understands the accused to be guilty of a pārājika and accuses him honestly on the basis of what one has seen, heard, or suspected, then — regardless of whether he is guilty or not — one has not committed an offense. Even in a case such as this, though, one incurs a dukkaṭa if making the charge without asking leave of the accused, and a pācittiya if making the charge so as to insult him.
Conculation : Making an unfounded charge to a bhikkhu that he has committed a pārājika offense, in hopes of having him disrobed, is a saṅghādisesa offense.
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